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LEGAL PROFESSION: REFLECTIONS ON THUKWANE v LAW SOCIETY OF 
THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 2014 5 SA 513 (GP) AND MTSHABE v LAW 
SOCIETY OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 2014 5 SA 376 (ECM) 
TC Maloka* 
1 Introduction 
The law reports are replete with cases involving applications for admission and 
enrolment in the roll of attorneys, removal from the roll, counter-applications 
challenging striking-off, and for readmission and enrolment. In each of these 
instances the critical issue is whether an applicant is a "fit and proper person" to be 
admitted or, in the case of an errant practitioner, whether he or she is still a "fit and 
proper person" to remain on the roll of attorneys. However, the threshold for being 
considered a "fit and proper person" is much higher than otherwise in proceedings 
for readmission and reenrolment. Put differently, the additional question to be 
answered in an application for re-admission is whether there has been a genuine, 
complete and permanent reformation on the part of the disbarred practitioner.  
While the battle between the law societies or bar councils and disbarred practitioners 
over readmission and reenrolment is a perennial feature on the rolls of many 
divisions of the High Court,1 the issue that had to be determined by Rabie J in 
Thukwane v Law Society of the Northern Provinces2 and Goosen J in Mtshabe v Law 
Society of the Cape of Good Hope3 respectively was different. It concerned a novel 
issue of whether a person previously convicted of a criminal offence and who was 
still serving a sentence in the sense of being a parolee could be admitted or re-
                                                 
*  Tumo Charles Maloka. BA, LLB, LLM (UCT). Senior Lecturer, Nelson R Mandela School of Law, 
(UFH). Email: tmaloka@ufh.ac.za. My thanks to Professors Chuks Okpaluba, Patrick Osode and 
Cephas Lumina for their valuable comments on this piece in draft form. The author gratefully 
acknowledges two anonymous reviewers for all their hard work. The usual disclaimer appliers. 
1  See the most recent incarnation of the quest for redemption: Theron v Law Society of the Cape 
of Good Hope 2015 ZAWCHC 23 (6 March 2015); Noordien v Cape Bar Council 2015 ZAWCHC 2 
(13 January 2015). 
2  Thukwane v Law Society of the Northern Provinces 2014 5 SA 513 (GP) ("Thukwane"). 
3  Mtshabe v Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2014 5 SA 376 (ECM) ("Mtshabe"). 
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admitted. Thukwane and Mtshabe engage important and interrelated issues 
demanding definitive and systematic consideration. 
Foremost is the term "fit and proper person". While it is not defined either in the 
Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 or the Advocates Act 74 of 1964, in Oliver Wendell Holmes' 
irony-tipped phrase, it casts a "brooding omnipresence"4 over entry into the 
profession and throughout a legal practitioner's life. The second is the controversial 
question whether, and to what extent, a parolee can be considered a "fit and proper 
person" to be admitted and enrolled. The third issue is whether the law society can 
create a legitimate expectation that the parolee would enter the legal profession 
inter alia by permitting the parolee to attend the School for Legal Practice and to 
write the attorneys' admission examination. Lastly there is the troubling issue 
concerning the duty of the relevant law society, as custos morum of the profession,5 
in fulfilling its statutory responsibility as an interested party in proceedings 
concerning the re-admission and reenrolment of a parolee. Granted that in the 
specific context of Mtshabe the law society did not oppose the re-admission of the 
applicant. That does not necessarily mean that it was persuaded that the applicant is 
a "fit and proper person" to be re-admitted as an attorney despite the applicant's 
being a parolee.  
2 The brooding omnipresence of the fitness requirement 
As officers of the courts lawyers play a vital role in upholding the Constitution and 
ensuring that the justice system is efficient and effective.6 While lawyers occupy a 
venerable position in society, rampant, sometimes virulent criticism of the legal 
                                                 
4  Southern Pacific Co v Jensen 244 US 205 (1917) 222. 
5  See Solomon v Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 1934 AD 401; Hassim (also known as 
Essack) v Incorporated Law Society of Natal 1977 2 SA 757 (A). 
6  In his keynote address to the Cape Law Society AGM, Justice Chaskalson spoke on the topic "The 
rule of law: The importance of independent courts and legal professions", in which he discussed 
the Legal Practice Bill [B20-2012] (LPB) and other topics linked to the independence of the 
judiciary. Justice Chaskalson highlighted the role of an independent legal profession as an 
essential component of a constitutional democracy. He commented: "Although not specifically 
mentioned in the Constitution, the judiciary depends on an independent legal profession to 
enable it to perform its constitutional duty. This is an incident of the rule of law which is 
entrenched in our Constitution. … Without the assistance of lawyers, judges would not be able to 
discharge their constitutional duty to uphold the law without fear or favour." (Chaskalson 2013 
De Rebus 13). 
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profession is longstanding.7 One of the overriding considerations behind the overhaul 
of the legal profession is the perceived ineffective regulation of legal practitioners by 
different constituent bodies at the expense of the public interest.8 The advent of 
constitutional democracy has in no uncertain terms demonstrated that the 
requirement of being "fit and proper" is decidedly a constitutional issue.9 The other 
aspect of constitutionality relates to the right to practise one's trade or profession.10 
In recent years, high profile cases involving the suspension and subsequent removal 
of the National Directors of Public Prosecution following probes into their fitness 
have brought the matter into sharp focus.11 
Conceived as a gatekeeping standard in the legal profession, the fitness requirement 
casts a brooding omnipresence over a lawyer's career regardless of whether the 
person is in legal practice or not. Although in exercising its disciplinary powers the 
court is usually concerned with conduct in the course of a lawyer's practice, one who 
has demonstrated unethical conduct unconnected with practice may still be found to 
be lacking the requisite honesty and integrity to remain in practice.12 The overriding 
concern is to safeguard the good name of the profession and the public interest.13 
                                                 
7  Ponnan JA in General Council of the Bar of SA v Geach 2013 2 SA 52 (SCA) para [87] begins his 
concurring judgement with the striking observation: "'The first thing we do, let’s kill all the 
lawyers' is Dick the Butcher’s exhortation in Henry VI to Jack Cade – 'the head of an army of 
rabble and a demagogue pandering to the ignorant'. That oft misunderstood phrase was William 
Shakespeare’s homage to lawyers as the primary defenders of democracy. Through it, the Bard 
recognised that for tyranny and anarchy to flourish, the law and all those who were sworn to 
uphold it had to first be eliminated. Lawyers, because of the adversarial nature of litigation in 
this country, will never be universally loved by the public. That is not to suggest that as 
members of a distinguished and venerable profession they do not occupy a very important 
position in our society. After all they are the beneficiaries of a rich heritage and the mantle of 
responsibility that they bear as the protectors of our hard won freedoms." Also see Rose 1998 
Stetson L Rev 345-369. 
8  Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014. 
9  Section 12(6)(a)(iv) of the National Prosecuting Act 112 of 1998. See further DA v President of 
the RSA 2013 1 248 (CC) paras 14-49. 
10  See De Freitas v Society of Advocates of Natal 1997 4 SA 1134 (N).  
11  See Ginwala 2008 http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/ginwala_report_1.pdf. Currently, 
President Jacob Zuma is going ahead with a probe into National Director of Public Prosecutions 
Mxolisi Nxasana's fitness to hold office (Legalbrief Today 2015 
http://legalbrief.co.za/diary/legalbrief-today/story/zuma-decides-to-go-for-npa-head/pdf/). 
12  In Pienaar & Versfeld v Incorporated Law Society 1902 TS 11 16, the Transvaal High Court 
formulated a test that still forms a sound basis for distinguishing between conduct by a 
practitioner that is intrinsically and necessarily unprofessional, and conduct that may be 
unprofessional and undesirable only because of the contingent conditions of legal practice within 
which it occurs. Innes JP asked: "Has [the Court] the power to prohibit conduct on the part of 
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What constitutes a fit and proper person for the legal profession is a notoriously 
elusive proposition.14 The fitness requirement is a question of fact, although it 
involves a value judgement. Central to the determination of this question is whether 
the applicant for admission is a person of absolute personal integrity, reliability and 
scrupulous honesty.15 The same ethical standards are demanded of advocates.16 It 
has been said that an advocate, whose calling is "one which is praiseworthy and 
necessary to human life", should "always cling to the famous principle that the true 
jurist is an honest man".17 These qualities of honesty and integrity must continue to 
be displayed throughout a legal practitioner's career. A practitioner who lacks these 
qualities cannot be expected to uphold the high standard of professional ethics. 
This brings to our attention a related consideration of fundamental importance to 
constitutional democracy. Like a dormant volcano, the simmering question of fitness 
to hold judicial office is bursting beneath the rarefied surface of the South African 
bench against the backdrop of allegations of incapacity, incompetence18 or 
impeachable misconduct.19 This is apparent from the unfolding conundrum facing 
the judiciary in the aftermath of grave allegations made against the Judge President 
of the Western Cape.20 In lodging a complaint of gross misconduct against Hlophe JP 
for violating the judicial authority of the apex court with the Judicial Service 
                                                                                                                                                        
practitioners, which though not in itself immoral or fraudulent, may yet in the opinion of the 
Court be inconsistent with the proper position of its practitioners and calculated, if generally 
allowed, to lead to abuses in the future?" Also see Pretoria Society of Advocates v Ledwaba 2014 
ZAGPPHC 849 (22 October 2014); Incorporated Law Society of the Transvaal v Mandela 1954 3 
SA 102 (T) 107B-108C. 
13  See New South Wales Bar Association v Hamman 1999 NSWCA 404 417; Legal Services 
Commissioner v Hewlett 2008 QLT 3. 
14  For a more complete exposition see Slabbert 2011 PELJ 212-218. 
15  Vassen v Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 1998 4 SA 532 (SCA) para 14. 
16  Section 3(1)(A) of the Advocates Act 74 of 1964. See Kekana v Society of Advocates of SA 1998 
4 SA 649 (SCA) 655I-656A; General Council of the Bar of SA v Matthys 2002 5 SA 1 (E) paras 
[34], [35]. 
17  Vereniging van Advokate van SA (Witwatersrand Afdeling) v Theunissen 1972 2 SA 218 (T). 
18  For further engagement: Okpaluba 2013 JJS 106-127; Okpaluba 2014 SALJ 631. 
19  See for eg Motata v S 2010 ZAGPJHC 134 (29 November 2010).  
20  The unprecedented events giving rise to the ongoing litigation have their roots in four related 
cases which were heard by the Constitutional Court during March 2008, conveniently referred to 
as the "Zuma/Thint cases" (Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 2 SA 277 
(SCA); Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 1 SA 1 (CC); Zuma v National 
Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 1 SA 141 (CC)). 
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Commission, and the latter's counter-complaint against the Constitutional Court 
justices,21 the "Langa Court"22 unwittingly opened a proverbial can of worms.23 
If the JSC eventually cuts the Gordian knot on the Hlophe matter, society will no 
longer be able to evade the spill-over. Put differently, the removal of a judge from 
office on the recommendation of the JSC after a finding of guilt constitutes the 
judiciary's version of capital punishment. It is the ultimate sanction that can be 
recommended by a Judicial Conduct Tribunal. But where, as in this case, the judicial 
officer in question rather than taking the personal initiative of resigning from office 
resorts to using the judicial process to forestall the disciplinary proceedings, the 
vexed question is whether such a judicial officer whose credibility has been 
impugned by the Judicial Conduct Tribunal or who after making a statement under 
oath resiles from that evidence24 can still be considered a fit and proper person to 
remain on the bench. In many ways, this is a question of enormous import in a 
constitutional democracy, given that the judiciary plays a sensitive and crucial role in 
controlling the exercise of power and upholding the Bill of Rights.25 The principles 
applying to a judicial officer demand that the holder of that esteemed office be a fit 
and proper person. The question is: assuming that such a judicial officer resigns or is 
impeached in the wake of the adverse credibility findings and/or gross misconduct, 
can he or she be readmitted or reinstated to the roll of legal practitioners? The 
straightforward answer is in the negative. This was luminously expounded by 
                                                 
21  Hlophe v JSC 2009 4 All SA 67 (GJ). 
22  The practice of naming a court after its Chief Justice is relatively novel in the Commonwealth, 
and deserves some explanation. The modern American practice of naming Supreme Court 
benches after its Chief Justice took hold in the 1960s, when books were published about the 
"Warren Court". In the period that followed, a number of books have appeared about the 
"Burger Court" and the "Rehnquist Court". See generally Frank Warren Court; Spaeth Warren 
Court; Cox Warren Court. In Canada, the practice began in 1984 but reached a high-water mark 
in 1991 with a special issue of Manitoba Law Journal dedicated to the "Dickson Court". Since that 
time, there have been articles on the "Laskin Court" and the "Lamer Court". For a full exposition: 
Bryant 1995 Osgoode Hall LJ 79; McCormick 1999 Dalhousie LJ 93. 
23  See Langa CJ v Hlophe 2009 4 SA 382 (SCA); Freedom Under the Law v Acting Chairperson of 
the Judicial Service Commission 2011 1 SA 546 (SCA); Acting Chairperson: Judicial Service 
Commission v Premier of the Western Cape Province 2011 3 SA 538 (SCA). 
24  Nkabinde v JSC President of Judicial Conduct Commission 2011 1 SA 279 (GJ). 
25  See Lawyers Association v Heath 2001 1 SA 883 (CC); Justice Alliance of SA v President of RSA 
2011 5 SA 388 (CC); Re Therrien 2002 2 SCR 3; Valente v The Queen 1985 2 SCR 733.  
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Bradley H Wright, sitting as the Chair of the Ontario Law Society Hearing Panel in 
Law Society of Upper Canada v Kerry Parker Evans:26 
A judge who is found by his or her peers to lack credibility takes a jackhammer to 
that foundation. Repairing the foundation consists not only in unplugging the 
jackhammer but in denying the jackhammer access to the foundation and the 
magnificent edifice which rests upon it for as long as it takes to restore informed 
public confidence in the soundness of the site. We find that an informed public 
would have its confidence in the legal profession shaken by a relatively swift 
restoration to membership in the Society of a former judge whose credibility was 
impugned by his peers on the bench, and who admits to needing ongoing 
psychological therapy and practice conditions including monitoring to ensure that 
the misconduct would not recur. 
We are also troubled by the fact that Mr Evans breached the most serious 
undertaking any person in Canada can give, an undertaking that no person, save a 
judicial appointee, can give. It is more serious than any other undertaking than even 
a Prime Minister can give for, while a Prime Minister may appoint judges, it is the 
judges who may one day sit in judgement of a Prime Minister. Mr Evans breached 
the undertaking, described in Re Therrien 2001 2 SCR 3, that a person gives when 
the person ascends to the bench of a Canadian court and accepts to sit in 
judgement of others. The sexual misconduct is one thing, and it is bad enough. It is 
exacerbated when it follows the giving of a solemn undertaking to comport one's self 
to the highest standards, and not to engage in misbehaviour. For reasons set forth 
in Re Therrien, ascending to the bench is tantamount to giving such an undertaking. 
From the perspective of the Law Society, breaching that undertaking is additional 
misconduct over and above the original misconduct.  
Kerry stands for the proposition that a judge's membership in the law society does 
not disappear, but goes into abeyance, attesting to a continuing interest of the 
society in what happens while that person is a judge. This means that although the 
misconduct occurred while the person was a judge, the law society should apply its 
standards as if that person was still a lawyer. The fact that a judge abused his 
position as a judicial officer reflects badly on his standing as a lawyer because he 
                                                 
26  Law Society of Upper Canada v Kerry Parker Evans 2006 ONLSHP 40 paras [101], [102] 
(emphasis added). The termination of Mr. Evans’ career as a justice of the Ontario Court of 
Justice was by resignation in circumstances where he may be presumed to have regarded his 
removal as a virtual certainty. 
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would not have been a judge but for having been a lawyer to start with. This has 
bearing for judges appointed from the ranks of the legal profession. In such 
circumstances, the bar may apply to have the former judge's name struck off the 
roll. 
3 Removal or suspension 
The inquiry into whether an attorney is a fit and proper person to remain in practice 
is governed by the provision of section 22(1)(d) of the Attorneys' Act of 1979.27 This 
entails a weighing of the conduct complained of against the conduct expected of an 
attorney and to this extent involves a value judgement.28 The appropriate sanction, 
namely a suspension from practice or striking from the roll, lies within the discretion 
of the court.29 An application for striking off the roll is in itself a disciplinary enquiry 
and sui generis,30 and not a lis between a law society and the attorney. The law 
society, as custos morum of the profession, places the facts before the court for 
consideration.31 The facts on which the court exercises its discretion are to be 
established on a balance of probabilities.32 Though the opinion or conclusion of the 
Law Society that the practitioner is no longer a fit and proper person to practice as 
an attorney carries substantial weight, the ultimate determination of fitness remains 
in the court's hands.33  
Striking off is the legal profession's version of capital punishment, and is the worst 
sanction that can be meted out by a court. An order for removal from the roll has 
generally been imposed if it has been found that the practitioner is no longer a fit 
and proper person to practice as attorney unless there are exceptional circumstances 
                                                 
27  Section 22(1(d) of the Attorneys' Act 53 of 1979 reads as follows: "(1) Any person who has been 
admitted and enrolled as an attorney may on application by the society concerned be struck off 
the roll or suspended from practice by the court within the jurisdiction of which he practices – 
(a) – (d). (b) If he, in the discretion of the court, is not a fit and proper person to continue to 
practise as an attorney." 
28  See Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope v C 1986 1 SA 616 (A); Jasat v Natal Law Society 
2000 3 SA 44 (SCA). 
29  See A v Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 1989 1 SA 849 (A) 851A-F. 
30  Prokureursorde van Transvaal v Kleynhans 1995 1 SA 839 (T) 851E-F. 
31  Cirota v Law Society of the Transvaal 1979 1 SA 172 (A) 187H. 
32  Law Society v Matthews 1989 4 SA 389 (T) 393I-J. 
33  Kaplan v Incorporated Law Society, Transvaal 1981 2 SA 762 (T) 781H. 
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justifying a lesser sanction such as suspension from practice,34 and has generally 
been made in the following situations: mishandling of trust monies;35 practising 
without being in possession of a fidelity fund certificate;36 misappropriation of 
funds;37 criminal conviction;38 overreaching;39 touting;40 defrauding the revenue;41 
deceitful conduct and perjury;42 contravention of the referral rule;43 and 
ungovernability.44  
                                                 
34  Van den Berg v General Council of the Bar 2002 2 All SA 499 (SCA) para [50]; Mafokate v Law 
Society of the Northern Provinces 2013 ZASCA 125 (23 September 2013) para 23; Law Society of 
the Northern Provinces v Mogami 2010 1 SA 186 (SCA) para [4]. 
35  See Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Mabando 2011 4 All SA 238 (SCA); Botha v Law 
Society of the Northern Provinces 2009 3 All SA 239 (SCA).  
36  See Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Viljoen, Law Society of the Northern Provinces v 
Dykes 2011 2 SA 327 (SCA). 
37  See Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Coetzee 2014 ZAGPPHC 621 (12 August 2014); Law 
Society of the Cape of Good Hope v Schoeman 2014 ZAWCHC 110 (29 July 2014). 
38  Ngwenya v Society of Advocates, Pretoria 2006 2 SA 88 (WLD) 90J-91; Hassim (also known as 
Essack) v Incorporated Law Society of Natal 1977 2 SA 757 (A) 768A-B; Incorporated Law 
Society of the Transvaal v Mandela 1954 3 SA 102 (T) 104A. 
39  General Council of the Bar v Geach 2013 2 SA 52 (SCA) paras 130-132.  
40  Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Sonntag 2012 1 SA 372 (SCA). See also Boome and 
Slabbert 2015 THRHR 407 
41  See Legal Services Commissioner v Stirling 2012 VCAT 347 para [85]. 
42  Kekana v Society of Advocates of SA 1998 4 SA 649 (SCA) 655G. Hefer JA stated: "I share the 
view expressed in Olivier’s case supra at 500H ad fin that, as a matter of principle, an advocate 
who lies under oath in defending himself in an application for the removal of his name from the 
roll, cannot complain if his perjury is held against him when the question arises whether he is a 
fit and proper person to continue practising." Also see General Council of the Bar v Geach 2013 2 
SA 52 (SCA) paras [142]; Johannesburg Society of Advocates v Van Blankenberg 2015 ZAGPJHC 
41 (13 March 2015). 
43  Cape Bar Council v Noordien 2013 ZAWCHC 138 (30 August 2013); Eastern Cape Society of 
Advocates v Vusani 2014 ZAECGHC 93 (31 October 2014); Rosemann v General Council of the 
Bar of South Africa 2004 1 SA 568 (SCA). 
44  The decisions of disciplinary panels of the Canadian Law Society are instructive. The concept of 
"ungovernability" was considered by the panel in Law Society of BC v Spears 2009 LSBC 28 para 
[7]. The Law Society Panel described the concept as follows: "The Panel is very concerned that 
the Respondent has in the past demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with conditions 
imposed upon him by the Law Society. It is a fundamental requirement of anyone who wishes to 
have the privilege of practising law that that person accept that their conduct will be governed 
by the Law Society and that they must respect and abide by the rules that govern their conduct. 
If a lawyer demonstrates that he or she is consistently unwilling or unable to fulfil these basic 
requirements of the privilege to practise, that lawyer can be characterized as 'ungovernable' and 
cannot be permitted to continue to practise." Also see Law Society of Upper Canada v John 
Phillip Thomas Middlebrook 2013 ONLSHP 103; Law Society of Upper Canada v Munro 2015 
ONLSTH 45. It is submitted that majority of cases on suspensions and disbarment in South Africa 
fall under the rubric of ungovernability. See eg De Wet v Law Society of the Northern Provinces, 
In Re: Law Society of the Northern Provinces v De Wet 2014 ZAGPHC 799 (10 October 2014); 
Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope v Qoboshiyane 2013 ZAECGHC 35 (18 April 2013). 
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4 The question for determination in proceedings for re-admission  
The path to a successful re-entry into the profession by a practitioner previously 
struck off the roll for conduct involving dishonesty is an arduous one.45 As a general 
rule, an order of striking off for serious professional misconduct is intended to be 
permanent.46 Re-admission is the exception rather than the rule. The applicant bears 
the difficult and formidable onus of proving that he or she is a fit and proper person 
to be re-admitted. In contrast to an application for admission, an application for re-
admission by a disbarred practitioner invariably attracts strict scrutiny.47 Refusal by 
an applicant to present appropriate evidence in support of his or her own 
readmission application is fatal.  
The crisp question for determination in proceedings for re-admission or 
reinstatement is whether there has been a genuine, complete and permanent 
reformation on the part of the disbarred practitioner seeking reinstatement.48 This 
involves an enquiry as to whether the defect of character or attitude which led to the 
practitioner being adjudged not fit and proper has been purged. In turn, this raises 
the delicate issue of an assessment of the reformation of the applicant's character 
and the prospects of his or her successful conformation in the future to the exacting 
demands of the profession that he or she seeks to re-enter. This brings to the fore 
the problematic issue of whether there is evidence of the careful and considered 
soul-searching required in order to demonstrate that the defect in character has 
been remedied and the applicant is indeed reformed. In effect, until and unless 
there is such a cognitive appreciation on the part of the disbarred practitioner, it is 
nigh impossible to see how the defect can be cured or corrected. Accordingly, any 
true and lasting reformation of necessity depends upon such appreciation. This is 
because the standards of the legal profession are exacting. There are cases where 
the gravity of professional misconduct by its very character may exclude the 
prospect of rehabilitation.49 Even though there is evidence indicating that it is 
                                                 
45  For a full discussion: Slabbert and Boome 2014 PELJ 44. 
46  Malan v Law Society of the Northern Provinces 2009 1 SA 216 (SCA) para [8]. 
47  Ex parte Aarons, Law Society Intervening 1985 3 SA 286 (T) 290C-G. 
48  See Law Society of the Transvaal v Behrman 1981 4 SA 538 (A) 557A-C; Society of the Cape of 
Good Hope v C 1986 1 SA 616 (A) 640C-D.  
49  Budricks v Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2008 ZAECHC 73 (24 April 2008) para [13]. 
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unlikely that a disbarred practitioner will repeat his or her previous misconduct, the 
first duty of the law society is to protect the public interest, particularly public 
confidence in every member of the profession. 
5 Facts and legal issues in Thukwane 
What weight should be given to the fact that an applicant for admission is still on 
parole for a serious offence? This is a novel issue in so far as admission or re-
admission in South Africa is concerned. At issue in Thukwane was the refusal to 
register the applicant's contract of articles on the ground that as a parolee he had 
failed to prove that he was a fit and proper person pursuant to section 4 of the Act. 
The applicant contended that he had been fully rehabilitated and that he was a fit 
and proper person to enter the profession. It was the position of the Law Society 
that given the nature and gravity of conviction for murder, violence and dishonesty, 
absent convincing evidence of genuine and enduring rehabilitation50 the applicant 
cannot be considered to have demonstrated good character, repute and fitness as 
envisaged by the provisions of section 4(b) of the Act. In seeking to review and set 
aside the respondent's decision, the applicant raised three principal arguments, 
namely legitimate expectation, the status of a parolee, and the lack of a fair hearing. 
In the ensuing discussion, only the issues of legitimate expectation and parolee 
status are considered. 
6 Legitimate expectation argument 
It was contended in Thukwane that the law society created a legitimate expectation 
that the parolee could enter the legal profession by way of articles, inter alia by 
allowing him to attend the practical legal training school and to write the attorneys' 
admission examination. The contention could not be sustained because there is no 
fitness requirement in respect of attendance at any of the courses or of writing this 
examination. Rabie J held that:51 
The applicant would have known that the question whether he was a fit and proper 
person would for the first time be considered and decided when he applied for the 
                                                 
50  Thukwane paras [20]-[31]. 
51  Thukwane para [42]. 
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registration of his contract of articles of clerkship. He thus knew that nothing had 
gone before could relieve him of his statutory obligation to prove to the respondent 
that he was a fit and proper person. The Act does not require of the respondent to 
consider the issue of fitness and propriety prior to a person applying for registration 
of his/her articles of clerkship. 
7 The question of parolee status 
The problem of applicants with a criminal record seeking admission into the 
honourable profession was extensively deliberated upon and the guiding principles 
established in the leading South African case on the subject – Ex parte Krause.52 The 
approach of South African courts is encapsulated in the following passage in the 
judgement of Innes CJ: 
The real fact is this - that in most cases the fact of the criminal conviction shows 
the man to be of such a character that he is not worthy to be admitted to the ranks 
of an honourable profession. That is the real ground upon which the Court acts in 
such cases; and it is from that standpoint in my opinion that we should regard the 
facts of this case.53 
In the present case it will be recalled that the applicant was still serving parole. In 
the context of the core principles and considerations referred to in cases dealing 
with applicants with criminal convictions,54 the court and society had to be more 
careful in deciding whether an applicant had proved his or her fitness in order to 
serve articles. As the High Court in Mtshabe explained:55 
The fact that the applicant had been placed on parole by the Department of 
Correctional Services should therefore be seen in the correct perspective. The 
decision to allow a convicted person to conclude his sentence outside of prison and 
subject to certain conditions is taken by the relevant parole board on the basis of 
certain criteria which obviously differ from the criteria used to establish whether a 
person is fit and proper to be allowed to have his contract of articles of clerkship 
registered, or to be admitted to practise as an attorney. The granting of parole is 
not an indication that the applicant should be regarded as a fit and proper person 
as envisaged by the Act and as was discussed in the cases referred to. 
For an applicant on parole to contend that he is a fit and proper person is to 
overstretch purpose and import of section 73(5) of the Correctional Services Act 11 
of 1998. A sound interpretation of the relevant provisions makes it clear that parole 
                                                 
52  Ex parte Krause 1905 TS 221. 
53  Ex parte Krause 1905 TS 221 223. 
54  Ex parte Moseneke 1978 4 SA 884 (T) 888E-889B; In re Ngwenya v Society of Advocates, 
Pretoria 2006 2 SA 87 (W). 
55  Mtshabe para [69]. 
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is a form of correction which may be imposed upon a sentenced prisoner in order to 
meet the broader objective of rehabilitating and reintegrating offenders into the 
community. Being on parole is antithetical to the requirements of being a fit and 
proper person. It should be borne in mind that the status of a parolee is not 
equivalent to one who has been unconditionally released from prison as having 
served his or her sentence of incarceration.  
It is appropriate to take note of two decisions of American courts cited by the High 
Court in Mtshabe.56 In the matter of In re Lazcano57 the Supreme Court of Arizona 
was confronted with the question whether a person who was subject to Texas 
deferred adjudication58 may be admitted to practise law in Arizona. Whilst an 
undergraduate student in Texas in 2002, the applicant had been arrested and 
indicted for burglary and sexual assault. The Texas court deferred adjudication while 
the applicant completed a 10-year term of probation. After graduating from law 
school he passed the Arizona bar examination and sought admission to practise in 
2008. The Arizona Committee on Character Fitness by majority recommended 
admission. The matter came before the Supreme Court by way of review and the 
court sought submission on the question as to the effect of the deferred adjudication 
on the applicant's fitness to practise law. The Supreme Court denied the application, 
citing amongst other reasons the public interest dimension at stake.59 
By contrast, the applicant in Michael T Miranda v The People of the State of 
Colorado60 was readmitted to practise whilst still on parole. He had been convicted 
of driving his vehicle whilst intoxicated and causing the death of a person. He 
received eight years imprisonment followed by five years mandatory parole. His law 
licence was suspended for two years. The court had found that the applicant had 
demonstrated the requisite degree of rehabilitation. He had for instance refrained 
from drinking since the motor vehicle accident; since then participated in 
                                                 
56  Mtshabe paras [33]-[35], [37]-[44]. 
57  In re Lazcano 222 P 3d 896 (201). 
58  A person on deferred adjudication is treated, in terms of the Texas Penal Code, as if the charge 
is still pending. (See In re Lazcano 222 P 3d 896 (201) fn 1). 
59  In re Lazcano 222 P 3d 896 (201) paras [15] and [16]. 
60  Michael T Miranda v The People of State of Colorado Unreported Case No 10PDJO97 of 17 April 
2012. 
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programmes run by Alcohol Anonymous; expressed remorse; and demonstrated 
appreciation of the nature of his conduct and its consequences. In reinstating the 
petitioner, the court imposed the following conditions: that he disclose in writing to 
and discuss with all prospective clients his status as a parolee and that he obtain 
written, informed consent from such clients confirming that he had disclosed his 
status. 
In addressing the vexed question of readmitting a person who is still on parole the 
Supreme Court of Colorado said the following:61 
... the Colorado Supreme Court has not addressed whether a parolee may properly 
be reinstated or readmitted to the practice of law. The People cite case law from 
sister jurisdictions rejecting parolees' applications for reinstatement, but we find 
those decisions factually distinguishable, inasmuch as the gravity of the applicants' 
criminal offenses in those cases reflects substantially more serious moral turpitude 
and thus represents a much larger hurdle to reinstatement. And even though some 
jurisdictions do apply a per se rule excluding parolees from the practice of law, the 
Hearing Board does not view the Petitioner's status as a parolee as an insuperable 
obstacle to his reinstatement. Instead, we conclude that the fact that the Petitioner 
is serving a parole sentence ought to be considered as but one element in the 
totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether his resumption of legal 
practice will be injurious to the public. 
Unlike the parolee in Michael T Miranda, Thukwane could not demonstrate sustained 
rehabilitation. The fact that the applicant in Thukwane conducted himself well during 
parole cannot on its own be regarded as clear and convincing evidence of 
rehabilitation.62 It is trite that parolees typically behave well while on parole, 
therefore admission authorities cannot properly evaluate rehabilitation. In short, an 
application for admission whilst on parole for serious criminal offences is premature. 
It is also relevant to take note of the Canadian case of Miller.63 There a doctor had 
engaged in an affair with a vulnerable patient and as a consequence he had been 
                                                 
61  Michael T Miranda v The People of State of Colorado Unreported Case No 10PDJO97 of 17 April 
2012 cited in Mtshabe para [34]. 
62  A report from a psychologist considered by the law society noted that it is "difficult to predict 
how the applicant would cope with the stress of private practice as it would depend on the 
manner in which he feels accepted and valued in the situation he finds himself in and the 
manner in which he addresses his defence mechanisms in time to come". It was also 
recommended to the applicant that he submit himself to psychotherapy sessions and submit 
another report to the Law Society in that regard (Mtshabe paras [28]-[31]). 
63  Barry Miller v Law Society of Upper Canada 2004 ONLSHIP 4. A slightly different version of the 
facts in Barry can be gleaned from the leading duress case of Preller v Jordaan 1956 1 SA 483 
(A). For further discussion: Glover 2006a SALJ 97-124; Glover 2006b SALJ 285-314.  
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removed from the medical register in Manitoba. He then obtained a law degree and 
applied for admission to the Law Society of Upper Canada. When he did so, he 
provided untruthful particulars about the sexual misconduct, admitting that he had 
been accused of it, but denying that it had happened. The LSUC Panel found that, at 
the time of the hearing, the evidence clearly established that Miller was a man of 
honesty, integrity and empathy, and that the incidents of his untruthfulness to the 
Society were not as a result of a fundamental character flaw or repeated course of 
conduct, but had resulted from a deep depression from which he had recovered. 
This is distinguishable from either Thukwane or Mtshabe. 
8 The problem of unresolved issues of the aftermath: Mtshabe  
Unlike Thukwane, in Mtshabe the applicant parolee was a disbarred practitioner 
who, rather like the 13 advocates in Geach,64 had "mounted the steed of greed".65 
In Mtshabe the question for determination was whether the applicant parolee had 
demonstrated that he had long since removed himself from the circumstances that 
led to his striking-off and from any unsettled or unresolved issues of the aftermath. 
Put another way, was there clear and convincing evidence of genuine, complete and 
lasting reformation on the part of the applicant. It is often said that courts are 
justifiably slower to reinstate and to put into the hands of an unworthy, disgraced 
practitioner that almost unlimited opportunity to inflict wrongs upon society 
possessed by a practising lawyer.66 The onus on an applicant in a readmission 
application is both high and stringent.67 In determining whether or not the onus has 
been discharged a court is called upon to have regard to the nature and degree of 
the conduct which led to his removal from the roll; the explanation afforded by him 
for such conduct; his actions in regard to an enquiry into his conduct and 
                                                 
64  In General Council of the Bar of SA v Geach 2013 2 SA 52 (SCA) para [181] Wallis JA refers to a 
case of a senior advocate appearing before the Pretoria Bar Disciplinary Committee on charges 
of double briefing and overreaching the RAF, who is reported to have explained his conduct with 
the telling expression: "As dit pap reen, moet jy skep." (If it rains porridge, you must help 
yourself). 
65  Mtshabe para [17]. 
66  See generally Swartzberg v Law Society of the Northern Provinces 2008 5 SA 322 (SCA) paras 
[14], [22]. 
67  Kudo v Cape Law Society 1972 4 SA 342 (C) 345H-346A; Lambert v Incorporated Law Society 
1910 TPD 77; Ex parte Wilcocks 1920 TPD 243; W v Incorporated Law Society, Transvaal 1953 4 
SA 189 (T) 191A–B. 
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proceedings to secure his removal; the lapse of time between his removal, the 
expression of contrition by him and its genuineness; and his efforts at repairing the 
harm which his conduct may have occasioned others. 
Leaving aside the issue of the parolee status, the salient features of Mtshabe's case 
in their totality did not remotely show that the applicant satisfied the relevant 
principles and considerations enunciated in seminal readmission cases from Krause, 
Behrman, and Aarons to Swartzberg. In this instance the applicant had been 
convicted of fraud and he was still on parole. During the criminal proceedings the 
trial court made adverse credibility findings against the applicant.68 In short, it found 
him to be a patently dishonest witness and rejected his evidence. The High Court 
spoke of the applicant's testimony in these words:69 
Having regard therefore to the nature of the offence for which the applicant was 
convicted as well as the dishonest and lying nature of the defence he proffered at 
trial, it is apparent that this is a matter in which the applicant must of necessity 
realise that his prospects of being readmitted to the profession of attorneys must 
be very slim indeed. In order to gain any prospect of readmission the applicant will 
have to discharge a heavy onus to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 
that he has indeed reformed and he is now a fit and proper person. 
A finding of lack of credibility by a court is very damning and one which the law society 
would have trouble setting aside regardless of an expression of contrition.70 In the 
words of the Chair of the Ontario Law Society Hearing Panel,71 "if there is a sterling 
quality of a lawyer, it has to be his candour and truthfulness". 
Since being struck off the roll following his conviction for fraud, the following 
questions may be posed: what was the explanation afforded by him for such 
transgression? What was the applicant's attitude in regard to an enquiry into his 
conduct and proceedings to secure his removal? The applicant sought to assign 
responsibility for his own conduct to his former candidate attorney. In the 
application for his removal he was found to be uncooperative, even obstructive in 
                                                 
68  In S v Mtshabe 2006 ZAECHC 80 (25 July 2006) para 34 Chetty J stated the following: "The 
accused’s blatant untruthfulness ... permeated every aspect of his evidence. He was not only a 
shocking witness with no regard for the truth but moreover he was an extremely evasive 
witness, whose answers during cross-examination bore little relation to the questions asked." 
69  Mtshabe para [14]. 
70  General Council of the Bar of SA v Geach 2013 2 SA 52 (SCA) paras [99]-[101]. 
71  Law Society of Upper Canada v Kerry Patrick Evans 2006 ONLSHP 40 para [93]. 
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dealing with the allegations against him. He then launched a counter-application 
vigorously resisting his removal from the roll, in the process making specious attacks 
against the law society.72  
The enormity of the applicant's conviction and professional misconduct and his parolee 
status bring to the fore problematic questions of rehabilitation. In effect, this prompts 
the difficult question: how does an applicant redeem himself where his integrity has 
been found wanting in serious respects, where he has made himself guilty of 
dishonest and unprofessional conduct, and where he has evinced defects of 
character which show beyond question that he was not a fit and proper person to be 
an attorney? The answer can be only by adducing cogent evidence of sufficient 
quality to "convince" the court of the applicant's "genuine, complete and permanent 
reformation," that "the defect of character" which caused the transgression "no 
longer exists," and "that he can in the future be trusted to carry out the duties of an 
attorney in a satisfactory way as far as members of the public are concerned". 
The evidence of reformation came from the applicant himself and supporting 
affidavits came from a former inmate, officials of the Department of Correctional 
Services and a number of organisations. These were buttressed by faith-based 
character witnesses. It is accepted that the applicant in reinstatement proceedings 
must show that his or her conduct is unimpeached and unimpeachable, and this can 
be established only by the evidence of trustworthy persons, especially members of 
                                                 
72  In giving short shrift to the counter application, Jones J in Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 
v Ntsikane Zim Michael Mtshabe (ECM) Unreported Case No 743/2007 16 cited in Mtshabe para 
[23] 382D-F made devastating findings regarding the applicant’s insight into the nature of his 
conduct: "A reading of the respondent’s papers in this application reveals anything but 
recognition of the seriousness of the fraud which he committed, anything but the need for a 
complete change of character. His attitude, and that of some of his character witnesses, is that 
he is guilty of no mere than 'a blunder'; or 'making a mistake'; or merely overcharging his 
clients; or an error of judgement for which he requires no more than a rap over the knuckles by 
way of a sanction. He was even so misguided as to suggest that the Law Society is somehow to 
blame for his default: the notion is, apparently, that he should have been taught to submit 
proper accounts to his clients. Is he really saying that the Law Society should train candidate 
attorneys how not to draw up fraudulent accounts? He refers in his documents to cases where 
forgiveness has publicly been given to prominent political personalities for serious offences, 
including offences of dishonesty. The terms in which he does so give rise to the inference that he 
does not appreciate that what has he did is particularly offensive because he is an attorney 
[original emphasis] and not a member of some other profession or organization. There is no 
evidence of soul-searching or coming to terms over the past ten years with the seriousness of 
what he did. There is no factual basis upon which we can with conviction hold that what he did 
in the past should not preclude him from practice in the future." (Emphasis added). 
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the profession and persons with whom the applicant has been associated since 
striking off.73 In this respect such evidence should demonstrate that the witnesses 
are sufficiently aware of the salient features of the disbarment to be able give 
informed and relevant evidence concerning the applicant. Otherwise the weight 
accorded to their evidence will be reduced. 
Reverting to the case at bar, the applicant described his period of imprisonment as a 
sabbatical and an opportunity to rediscover and reunite with his God. There was no 
doubt that the applicant made strenuous efforts whilst in prison and subsequent to 
his release on parole to demonstrate his commitment to reform his character. The 
applicant maintained that he had entirely purged his guilt and made amends. He 
tendered a supporting affidavit deposed by the former candidate attorney confirming 
that he had apologised to her and that she had accepted his apology. He also made 
settlement arrangements with the revenue and the Assets Forfeiture Unit. In a 
nutshell, on the basis of these measures and in particular the fact that he was now a 
"born again" Christian, the applicant considered himself entirely reformed in 
character, and accordingly a fit and proper person to be readmitted to the roll of 
attorneys. 
Granted that the applicant was an exemplary inmate and a born-again Christian with 
a long list of witnesses to his good character, these factors standing alone are never 
enough to discharge the difficult and formidable onus of demonstrating genuine, 
complete and permanent reformation. Goosen J reasoned as follows:74 
His description of being "born again" and his resort to a stylised biblical rhetoric 
capturing the image of the prodigal son returned does not provide a substantive 
basis upon which a balance of probabilities can be determined. These proceedings 
are not about "forgiveness" or about "pardoning" the "sins" of the errant 
practitioner. The applicant is required to discharge a burden of proof. His faith does 
not assist in determining probabilities. It is his own case that he was a lay minister 
at the time of the commission of these offences. From this it must be assumed that 
he was at the time - at least outwardly - functioning in accordance with the tenets 
of the faith that he now says will preclude him from any further transgressions. We 
have only his word to go on. That word must be evaluated in the context of what is 
known about the serious defects in his character which rendered him unfit to be an 
attorney of this court. 
                                                 
73  See for instance, General Council of the Bar of SA v Geach 2013 2 SA 52 (SCA) para [204]. 
74  Mtshabe para [28]. 
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The applicant's argument that he is reformed must be measured against some of the 
questionable assertions made in his readmission application. For instance the 
applicant's dogged assertion that he had "only inflated the claims beyond the tariff" 
reflected little or no appreciation of the gravity of his misconduct as an attorney. To 
make matters worse for the applicant, the picture presented in the readmission 
application was more serious than in the striking off application. While 
acknowledging committing fraud and lying during his criminal trial, he characterised 
his conduct as a "blunder, which is more than a mistake". The sincerity, frankness, 
and truthfulness of the applicant in presenting and discussing the factors relating to 
his removal and readmission did not meet the threshold test of complete and 
genuine rehabilitation.  
A common thread between Thukwane and Mtshabe is that a sufficient period of time 
had not lapsed before the application for admission or readmission was launched. As 
already stated, both applicants were on parole. The requirement that sufficient time 
must elapse is designed partly to ensure than an applicant is clear of the brambles 
that arose from the thorny ground of his criminal convictions and subsequent 
striking off, and partly to ensure as much as possible that the decision to readmit is 
supportable, will not redound harmfully to the Law Society, and is in the long-term 
interests of the public and the profession. Viewed through the prism of analysis in 
Swartzberg,75 like the disbarred practitioner in Budricks,76 Mtshabe did not 
demonstrate that he had fully extricated and distanced himself from the conduct and 
circumstances that led to his disbarment. In this regard one can do no better than to 
quote from a speech by Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Bolton:77  
It often happens that a solicitor appearing before the tribunal can adduce a wealth 
of glowing tributes from his professional brethren. He can often show that for him 
and his family the consequences of striking off or suspension would be little short of 
tragic. Often he will say, convincingly, that he has learned his lesson and will not 
offend again. On applying for restoration after striking off, all these points may be 
                                                 
75  See Swartzberg v Law Society of the Northern Provinces 2008 5 SA 322 (SCA) paras [25], [26].  
76  In Budricks v Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2008 ZAECHC 73 (24 April 2008) para [13]. 
See also Budricks v Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2003 2 SA 11 (SCA). 
77  Bolton v Law Society 1994 1 WLR 512 (CA) 518 (emphasis added). 
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made, and the former solicitor may also be able to point to real efforts made to re-
establish himself and redeem his reputation. All these matters are relevant and 
should be considered. But none of them touches the essential issue, which is the 
need to maintain among members of the public a well-founded confidence that any 
solicitor whom they instruct will be a person of unquestionable integrity, probity and 
trustworthiness ...The reputation of the profession is more important than the 
fortunes of any individual member. Membership of a profession brings many 
benefits, but that is a part of the price. 
It would seem to be very clear that nothing is more corrosive to the public 
confidence in the legal profession than the spectre of a court reinstating a 
practitioner who was removed for dishonesty only for the practitioner to commit 
another act of dishonesty. A readmission court must be convinced (very closely to) 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the delinquent practitioner will not re-offend. 
9 The failure of the custos morum to participate in proceedings 
concerning re-admission of a disbarred parolee 
In a situation where a court is faced with an application raising novel and potentially 
far-reaching questions of principle concerning the reinstatement of an errant legal 
practitioner who is still on parole for a very serious offence, the decision taken by 
the respondent law society in Mtshabe not to oppose his application for readmission 
does not accord with the well-settled constitutional notion of public accountability in 
South African public law.78 Accordingly, the High Court rightly found the attitude 
displayed by the law society astonishing. It will be recalled that the applicant had 
vehemently opposed the respondent's application to strike his name from the roll. 
No doubt the High Court deprecated the unacceptable stance adopted by the 
respondent law society as custos morum. Goosen J said:79 
The statement made by the respondent, indicating that it does not oppose the 
admission of the applicant, must necessarily mean that the respondent was indeed 
persuaded that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be admitted as an 
attorney "notwithstanding that the applicant is a parolee". In order to have adopted 
                                                 
78  President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 1 SA 1 (CC) para 133; Public Protector v Mail & Guardian 
2011 4 SA 420 (SCA) para 3. Also see Okpaluba 2006 Speculum Juris 248. 
79  Mtshabe para [57]. 
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this view of the application the respondent must have considered the fact that the 
applicant is a parolee. Quite how the respondent could have considered that this 
fact in itself does not disqualify the applicant in the light of the complete lack of 
legal precedent relating to the effect that being on parole has upon an application 
for readmission as an attorney, defies explanation. 
The crucial and sensitive role played by the law society in proceedings for the 
admission or re-admission of an attorney can hardly be overstated. As respondent in 
such proceedings, the law society stands as amicus curiae in the public interest in 
relation to the court seized with the matter. This is apparent from the fact that an 
application for admission or readmission cannot be made without certain 
jurisdictional facts having been established.80 In doing so the law society must take 
into account all the circumstances of the case with due regard to the demands of the 
proper administration of justice, and the interests of the profession and the public.81 
The opinion of the law society that it is satisfied that an applicant is a fit and proper 
person carries considerable weight. It is also trite that a court would ordinarily not 
interfere with the law society's disciplinary process until after it is finalised.82 It is 
also clear from Canadian jurisprudence83 that the readmission or restoration must 
not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the profession, the judicial 
system, or the administration of justice, or be contrary to the public interest.  
                                                 
80  For instance in the matter of Hurter v Hough 1987 1 SA 380 (C), Mr Hough, a private citizen, 
brought an application for Mr Hurter, a legal practitioner, to be struck from the roll without first 
lodging a complaint with the law society. The court dismissed the application because complaints 
of misconduct should be investigated by the Law Society. 
81  In Mtshabe para [60] Goosen J reminded the respondent of its proper role as custos morum: "In 
relation to the public a law society is required to exercise disciplinary authority over its members. 
In doing so it must act in the public interest as well as in the interests of the profession as a 
whole. These obligations impose upon a law society particular responsibilities. In the first 
instance, a law society is accountable to the public at large in respect of the exercise of its 
disciplinary powers. Secondly, it is obliged to ensure that its members maintain the highest 
standards of professional ethics and conduct as are applicable to members of an honourable 
profession. Thirdly, a law society is obliged to exercise its powers in relation to disciplinary 
matters, whether or not those disciplinary proceedings are such as are provided for by the Act or 
the disciplinary proceedings which are sui generis, and in respect of which the courts exercise 
jurisdiction." 
82  See Graham v Law Society, Northern Provinces 2014 4 SA 229 (GP) paras [78]-[82]; Law Society 
of the Transvaal v Meyer 1983 2 SA 505 (T) 507G-509A; Law Society v Taute 1931 TPD 12 17. 
83  See Re Gordon David Goldman, May 5, 1987 (LSUC); McOuat v Law Society of British Columbia 
1993 BCJ No 807 (CA); Re Asgareli Mohamed Manek, February 23, 1995 (LSUC); Re George 
Stephen Weisman, January 27, 1997 (LSUC); Watt v Law Society of Upper Canada 2005 OJ No 
2431 (Div Ct). 
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10 Conclusion 
There is, perhaps, a broader significance to Thukwane and Mtshabe, apart from their 
providing important guidance on the novel question as to whether a person 
previously convicted of a criminal offence and who is still serving a sentence under 
parole can be considered to be a fit and proper person to be admitted and/or 
readmitted into the legal profession. There can be no dispute that the developments 
in our nascent constitutional democracy have proved to all and sundry that the 
fitness requirement is a decidedly constitutional issue. The legal profession forms the 
cornerstone of the independence of the judiciary as well as a protector of our hard-
won constitutional democracy. It therefore stands to reason that legal practitioners 
of whatever standing ought to be trusted to the ends of the earth. 
There are a number of principles and considerations that can be distilled from 
Thukwane and Mtshabe to guide the newly constituted SA Legal Practice Council and 
Provincial Councils in setting up norms and standards for the admission and re-
admission as well as regulation of the professional conduct of legal practitioners in 
order to ensure accountable conduct. In sum, the law society regulates the legal 
profession in the public interest. Public confidence in the legal profession is more 
important than the fortunes of any one practitioner or prospective practitioner. 
Public confidence is predicated on such matters as the lawyer's credibility, integrity, 
character, repute, and fitness. While compassion for the practitioner has its place, 
compassion should not compromise an impartial adjudication of such matters. The 
ability to practise law is not a right but a privilege. The privilege may be regained, no 
matter how serious the misconduct that led to its loss, provided sufficiently 
compelling evidence of genuine and permanent rehabilitation is presented. This will 
be hard to do. The legal profession, of all professions, has a special responsibility to 
recognize cases of true rehabilitation; however, as rehabilitation will be claimed by 
virtually all applicants, independent corroborating evidence is required to establish 
that the rehabilitation is genuine and lasting. Finally, the admission or readmission 
must not be damaging to the integrity and standing of the profession, the judicial 
system, or the administration of justice, or be contrary to the public interest. 
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